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Response to the Law Commission Consultation on Reform of 
the Communications Offences 
 
Dr Elizabeth Tiarks and Dr Marion Oswald, Northumbria University Law School. 
 
Consultation Question 1. 
7.1 We provisionally propose that section 127(1) of the Communications Act 2003 and 
section 1 of the Malicious Communications Act 1988 should be repealed and 
replaced with a new communications offence according to the model that we 
propose below. Do consultees agree? 
We agree that there is need for reform, but do not agree with the current framing of the new offence, 
as per our responses to the other consultation questions below.  In providing our response, we have 
focused only on consultation questions 1-9. 
 
Consultation Question 2 
7.2 We provisionally propose that the offence should cover the sending or posting of any letter, electronic 
communication or article (of any description). It should not cover the news media, broadcast media, or 
cinema. Do consultees agree? 
We would suggest that clarity is needed in respect of the term ‘sending’ in the context of digital and 
internet communications to ensure that, to potentially fall foul of the new offence, any digital 
communication would need to have been posted so that it was viewable by others, and not merely sent 
to the communications platform provider, for instance to be held as a draft.  We would also suggest that 
consideration be given to whether the moderated or semi-moderated comments sections of online news 
media, and also the linking of broadcast media to hashtags (thus encouraging or making social media 
comment), should be specifically subject to the offence. 
Consultation Question 3. 
7.4 We provisionally propose that the offence should require that the communication was likely to cause 
harm to someone likely to see, hear, or otherwise encounter it. Do consultees agree? 
We accept the need to broaden the scope of the existing offence under s.1 MCA 1988, but are concerned 
that the proposed offence goes too far by the inclusion of the words “or otherwise encounter it”. The 
“likely audience” requirement does not achieve the stated aim of ensuring the offence is not overly 
broad, as it covers cases where the communication was passed on. Particularly with electronic 
communications, this allows for such a broad conception of “likely audience” that it is not significantly 
different to “any person”. 
The removal of the words “or otherwise encounter it” would narrow the offence to a more reasonable 
scope. This does not leave indirect victims without redress, as there are alternative methods of tackling 
indirect harms to “information subjects” through civil law, and specifically the tort of misuse of private 
information and data protection remedies, which may well be more appropriate to example 1 on page 
113 of the consultation document. 
Furthermore, it is unclear how the definition of “likely audience” would be interpreted in the case of 
closed, semi-closed or targeted internet groups, say of like-minded individuals, where the online 
conversation – while not illegal – may be offensive to those who did not share the expressed views.  
Others may become aware of those communications (because of the nature of the internet, 
communications are easily copied and disseminated) but would they be the likely audience?   
 
Consultation Question 4. 
7.5 We provisionally propose that the offence should require that the communication was likely to cause 
harm. It should not require proof of actual harm. Do consultees agree? 
The rationale for preferring “likely harm” over “actual harm” is understood. There is a difficulty however 
with the pairing of “likely harm” with “likely audience”, which means that there are two vague and rather 
wide terms of reference used together, resulting in a very broad remit for the offence. If “likely harm” is 
to be used, the offence as a whole may need to be more narrowly focused. This could be achieved by: a 
narrower framing of “likely audience”, as recommended above; using an objective test to determine 
whether a reasonable person in the position of someone in the “likely audience” was likely to be harmed 
(similar to the NZ offence under s.22 HDCA); and including a list of possible factors for the court to take 
into account, as has been considered.  It will be important in these factors to reflect recent case-law 
which has thrown doubt on whether even considerably offensive, irritating, provocative, contentious or 
abusive communications should be subject to criminalisation (Scottow [2020] EWHC 3421 (Admin); Miller 
[2020] EWHC 225 (Admin)).  We would suggest that examples 1, 2 and 3 in the consultation – while of 
course offensive and misguided -  do not meet the serious threshold for criminalisation, especially as 
other remedies are available, such as the torts of misuse of private information and defamation, action 
by the employer and action by the online platform for breach of its terms of use.  Would it not be better 
to focus on any underlying criminal issue to which the communication may be contributing e.g. glorifying 
terrorism, soliciting grievous bodily harm etc? 
Consultation Question 5. 
7.6 “Harm” for the purposes of the offence should be defined as emotional or psychological harm, 
amounting to at least serious emotional distress. Do consultees agree? 
We agree that criminal law can be applicable to actions which cause serious emotional distress, although 
it is an ill-defined concept. We are uncertain about the inclusion of “at least” (serious emotional distress), 
as it is unclear what is envisaged as harm going beyond this and what would and would not be included. 
The difficulty with the use of “serious emotional distress” in this proposed offence is that it is used to 
refer to likely harm rather than actual harm. The lack of clarity is therefore more problematic, but could 
be partially remedied by the inclusion of factors, as identified. 
 
7.7 If consultees agree that “harm” should be defined as emotional or psychological harm, amounting to 
at least serious emotional distress, should the offence include a list of factors to indicate what is meant by 
“serious emotional distress”? 
Yes, we agree that a list of factors would be useful to guide courts and to ensure that the offence is not 
applied too broadly. It may be useful to consider including both a list of factors that are likely to support a 
finding of serious emotional distress, as well as factors which would mitigate such a finding. The list of 
factors in the NZ offence are helpful.  It will be important in these factors to reflect recent case-law which 
has thrown doubt on whether even considerably offensive, irritating, provocative, contentious or abusive 
communications should be subject to criminalisation (Scottow [2020] EWHC 3421 (Admin); Miller [2020] 
EWHC 225 (Admin)). 
 
Consultation Question 6. 
7.8 We provisionally propose that the offence should specify that, when considering whether the 
communication was likely to cause harm, the court must have regard to the context in which the 
communication was sent or posted, including the characteristics of a likely audience. Do consultees 
agree? 
Potentially, although it would require a narrower conception of “likely audience”, as suggested above in 
our response to Question 4. 
 
Consultation Question 7. 
7.9 We provisionally propose that the new offence should not include a requirement that the 
communication was likely to cause harm to a reasonable person in the position of a likely audience. Do 
consultees agree? 
No, we disagree. A “reasonable person” requirement, which takes into account the position of someone 
in the likely audience is needed. The proposed wording of “likely to cause harm to a likely audience” is 
otherwise too broad in scope and raises issues in relation to Article 10 ECHR bearing in mind recent case-
law as mentioned above. The scope of what might be considered harmful could be viewed as 
insufficiently precise, especially when “likely audience” remains so broad. A “reasonable person” 
requirement at least partially delimits this. It would also provide a more concrete basis for demonstrating 
the proportionality of any interference with the Article 10 right. 
 
Consultation Questions 8 and 9. 
7.10 We provisionally propose that the mental element of the offence should include subjective awareness 
of a risk of harm, as well as intention to cause harm. Do consultees agree? Rather than awareness of a 
risk of harm, should the mental element instead include awareness of a likelihood of harm? 
While we understand the need for the offence to cover circumstances other than where there was a clear 
intention, we believe that awareness of a ‘risk of harming’ is again too low a threshold. The risk (in the 
sense of likelihood of something happening and the impact if it does) could be very low, but a person’s 
actions could still fall within the mental element.  We would suggest that it would be more appropriate 
for a second mental element to be based around recklessness in respect of a significant risk of harm 
(subject to our comments about the definition of harm set out above). 
